


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>ii</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Does Wage Persistence Matter for Employment Fluctuations? Evidence from Displaced Workers</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Johannes F.</gnm><snm>Schmieder</snm><aff>Columbia U and IZA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Till</gnm><snm>von Wachter</snm><aff>Columbia U and IZA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>21</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Previous literature has found that tight labor market conditions during
a job raise wages. Using the Displaced Worker Survey from 1984 to 2006, we show that wage gains associated with good labor market conditions disappear at job loss. We also find that workers with higher wages due to tight past labor market conditions face higher
risk of layoff. These findings suggest an important role of persistent
rigidities in the wage setting process that are related to layoff decisions.
This supports the notion that downward rigid employment contracts help explain the Shimer (2005) "puzzle" of low wage relative to employment fluctuations. (JEL J31, J41, J63)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.1</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2009-0126_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2009-0126_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Information, Direct Access to Farmers, and Rural Market Performance in Central India</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Aparajita</gnm><snm>Goyal</snm><aff>World Bank</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>22</ppf>
<ppl>45</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper estimates the impact of a change in procurement strategy of a private buyer in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. Beginning in October 2000, Internet kiosks and warehouses were established that provide wholesale price information
and an alternative marketing channel to soy farmers in the state. Using a new market-level dataset, the estimates suggest a significant increase in soy price after the introduction of kiosks, supporting the predictions of the theoretical model. Moreover, there is a robust increase in area under soy cultivation. The results point toward an
improvement in the functioning of rural agricultural markets. (JEL O13, O18, Q12, Q13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.22</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.22</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2009-0087_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2009-0087_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Information from Markets Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agricultural Markets in Niger</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jenny C.</gnm><snm>Aker</snm><aff>Tufts U and Center for Global Development</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>46</ppf>
<ppl>59</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Price dispersion across markets is common in developing countries. Using novel market and trader-level data, this paper provides estimates of the impact of mobile phones on price dispersion across
grain markets in Niger. The introduction of mobile phone service between 2001 and 2006 explains a 10 to 16 percent reduction in grain price dispersion. The effect is stronger for market pairs with
higher transport costs. (JEL O13, O33, Q11, Q13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.46</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.46</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2009-0141_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2009-0141_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Microfinance Games</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Xavier</gnm><snm>Gin&eacute;</snm><aff>World Bank</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Pamela</gnm><snm>Jakiela</snm><aff>Washington U in St Louis</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Dean</gnm><snm>Karlan</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jonathan</gnm><snm>Morduch</snm><aff>NYU</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>60</ppf>
<ppl>95</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Microfinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance
mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental
economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group
contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse. (JEL D82, G21, G31, O16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.60</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.60</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2007-0006_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Do Temporary-Help Jobs Improve Labor Market Outcomes for Low-Skilled Workers? Evidence from "Work First"</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David H.</gnm><snm>Autor</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Susan N.</gnm><snm>Houseman</snm><aff>Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>96</ppf>
<ppl>128</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Temporary-help jobs offer rapid entry into paid employment, but they are typically brief and it is unknown whether they foster longer term
employment. We utilize the unique structure of Detroit's welfare-to-
work program to identify the effect of temporary-help jobs on labor market advancement. Exploiting the rotational assignment of welfare clients to numerous nonprofit contractors with differing job placement rates, we find that temporary-help job placements do
not improve and may diminish subsequent earnings and employment outcomes among participants. In contrast, job placements with direct-hire employers substantially raise earnings and employment over a seven quarter follow-up period. (JEL J22, J23, J24, J31, J68)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.96</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.96</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2008-0231_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2008-0231_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Why Have College Completion Rates Declined? An Analysis of Changing Student Preparation and Collegiate Resources</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>John</gnm><snm>Bound</snm><aff>U MI</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Michael F.</gnm><snm>Lovenheim</snm><aff>Cornell U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Sarah</gnm><snm>Turner</snm><aff>U VA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>129</ppf>
<ppl>57</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Rising college enrollment over the last quarter century has not been met with a proportional increase in college completion. Comparing the high school classes of 1972 and 1992, we show declines in college completion rates have been most pronounced for men who first enroll in less selective public universities and community colleges. We decompose the decline into the components due to changes in preparedness of entering students and due to changes in collegiate characteristics, including type of institution and resources per student. While both factors play some role, the supply-side characteristics are most important in explaining changes in college completion. (JEL I23)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.129</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.129</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2008-0059_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2008-0059_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>US Environmental Regulation and FDI: Evidence from a Panel of US-Based Multinational Firms</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Rema</gnm><snm>Hanna</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>158</ppf>
<ppl>89</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper measures the response of US-based multinationals to the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA). Using a panel of firm-level data over the period 1966-1999, I estimate the effect of regulation on a multinational's foreign production decisions. The CAAA
induced substantial variation in the degree of regulation faced by firms, allowing for the estimation of econometric models that control for firm-specific characteristics and industrial trends. I find that the
CAAA caused regulated multinational firms to increase their foreign
assets by 5.3 percent and their foreign output by 9 percent. Heavily regulated firms did not disproportionately increase foreign investment in developing countries. (JEL F23, K32, L51, Q52, Q53, Q58)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.158</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.158</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2008-0155_data.pdf</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Service Delivery and Corruption in Public Services: How Does History Matter?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Priyanka</gnm><snm>Pandey</snm><aff>World Bank</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>190</ppf>
<ppl>204</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper provides microlevel evidence of how past institutions impact present economic outcomes. It looks at the impact of colonial land tenure institutions on local governance and education outcomes in northern India. Outcomes are worse in villages that belong to areas with a history of concentration of power with the elites. Such areas continue to retain a greater political presence of socially and
economically dominant classes. Future research should examine the success of policies that attempt to break such persistence through empowerment of nonelite groups. (JEL D02, H70, I20, N35, N45, O15, O18)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.190</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.190</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2009-0154_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Teacher Incentives</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Paul</gnm><snm>Glewwe</snm><aff>U MN, St Paul</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Nauman</gnm><snm>Ilias</snm><aff>Compass Lexecon, Washington, DC</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Kremer</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>205</ppf>
<ppl>27</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We analyze a randomized trial of a program that rewarded Kenyan primary school teachers based on student test scores, with penalties for students not taking the exams. Scores increased on the formula used to reward teachers, and program school students scored higher on the exams linked to teacher incentives. Yet most of the gains were focused on the teacher reward formula. The dropout rate was unchanged. Instead, exam participation increased among enrolled students. Test scores increased on exams linked to the incentives, but not on other, unrelated exams. Teacher attendance and homework
assignment were unaffected, but test preparation sessions increased. (JEL I21, I28, J13, O15)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.205</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.205</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2008-0221_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Marianne</gnm><snm>Bertrand</snm><aff>U Chicago and IZA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Claudia</gnm><snm>Goldin</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Lawrence F.</gnm><snm>Katz</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>228</ppf>
<ppl>55</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The careers of MBAs from a top US business school are studied to understand how career dynamics differ by gender. Although male and female MBAs have nearly identical earnings at the outset of their careers, their earnings soon diverge, with the male earnings advantage reaching almost 60 log points a decade after MBA completion. Three proximate factors account for the large and rising gender gap in earnings: differences in training prior to MBA graduation, differences in career interruptions, and differences in weekly hours. The
greater career discontinuity and shorter work hours for female MBAs
are largely associated with motherhood. (JEL J16, J22, J31, J44)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.228</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.228</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2009-0244_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2009-0244_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>2</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>July 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=2&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Freedom Fries</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Guy</gnm><snm>Michaels</snm><aff>London School of Economics</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Xiaojia</gnm><snm>Zhi</snm><aff>Guangzhou, China</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>256</ppf>
<ppl>81</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Do firms always choose the cheapest suitable inputs, or can group attitudes affect their choices? To investigate this question, we examine the deterioration of relations between the United States and France from 2002-2003, when France's favorability rating in the US fell by 48 percentage points. We estimate that the worsening attitudes reduced bilateral trade by about 9 percent and that trade in inputs
probably declined similarly, by about 8 percent. We use these estimates to calculate the average decrease in firms' willingness to pay for French (or US) commodities when attitudes worsened. (JEL D24, F13, F14, L14, L21)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.2.3.256</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.2.3.256</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2009-0180_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2009-0180_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


