<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Are There Missing Girls in the United States? Evidence from Birth Data</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jason</gnm><snm>Abrevaya</snm><aff>U TX</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>34</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We offer evidence of gender selection within the United States.
Analysis of comprehensive birth data shows unusually high boy-birth
percentages after 1980 among later children (most notably third and
fourth children) born to Chinese and Asian Indian mothers. Based
upon linked data from California, Asian Indian mothers are found
to be significantly more likely to have a terminated pregnancy and to
give birth to a boy when they have previously only given birth to girls.
The observed boy-birth percentages are consistent with over 2,000
"missing" Chinese and Indian girls in the United States between
1991 and 2004. (JEL J11, J16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.1</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2008-0039_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Alan S.</gnm><snm>Gerber</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Dean</gnm><snm>Karlan</snm><aff>Yale U and Innovations for Poverty Action, New Haven, CT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Daniel</gnm><snm>Bergan</snm><aff>MI State U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>35</ppf>
<ppl>52</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We conducted a field experiment to measure the effect of exposure
to newspapers on political behavior and opinion. Before the 2005
Virginia gubernatorial election, we randomly assigned individuals to
a Washington Post free subscription treatment, a Washington Times
free subscription treatment, or a control treatment. We find no effect
of either paper on political knowledge, stated opinions, or turnout in
post-election survey and voter data. However, receiving either paper
led to more support for the Democratic candidate, suggesting that
media slant mattered less in this case than media exposure. Some evidence
from voting records also suggests that receiving either paper led
to increased 2006 voter turnout. (JEL D72, L82)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.35</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.35</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/data/2007-0007_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Income Inequality and Progressive Income Taxation in China and India, 1986-2015</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Thomas</gnm><snm>Piketty</snm><aff>Paris School of Economics</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Nancy</gnm><snm>Qian</snm><aff>Brown U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>53</ppf>
<ppl>63</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper evaluates income tax reforms in China and India. The
combination of fast income growth and under-indexed tax schedule
in China implies the fraction of the Chinese population subject to
income tax has increased from less than 0.1 percent in 1986 to about
20 percent in 2008, while it has stagnated around 2-3 percent in
India. Chinese income tax revenues, as a share of GDP, increased
from less than 0.1 percent in 1986 to about 1.5 percent in 2005 and
2.5 percent in 2008, while the constant adaptation of exemption
levels and income brackets in India have caused them to stagnate
around 0.5 percent of GDP. (JEL D31, H24, 015, 023, P23, P35)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.53</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.53</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/data/2007-0004_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2007-0004_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Racial Group Loyalty</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Christina M.</gnm><snm>Fong</snm><aff>Carnegie Mellon U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Erzo F. P.</gnm><snm>Luttmer</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>64</ppf>
<ppl>87</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We investigate the role of racial group loyalty on generosity in a
broadly representative sample of the US adult population. We use
an audiovisual presentation to manipulate beliefs about the race,
income, and worthiness of Hurricane Katrina victims. Respondents
then decide how to divide $100 between themselves and Katrina
victims. We find no effects of victims' race on giving on average.
However, respondents who report feeling close to their racial or ethnic
group give substantially more when victims are of the same race,
while respondents who do not feel close to their group give substantially
less. (JEL D64, J15, Q54)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.64</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.64</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2007-0098_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Do Labor Market Rigidities Have Microeconomic Effects? Evidence from within the Firm</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Francine</gnm><snm>Lafontaine</snm><aff>U MI</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jagadeesh</gnm><snm>Sivadasan</snm><aff>U MI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>88</ppf>
<ppl>127</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We exploit a unique outlet-level dataset from a multinational chain
with over 2,500 outlets in 43 countries to investigate the effects of
labor regulations that protect employment. The dataset contains
information on output, materials, and labor costs at a weekly frequency
over several years, allowing us to examine the consequences
of labor market rigidity at a much more detailed level than has been
possible to date. We find that higher labor market rigidity is associated
with significantly higher levels of hysteresis. We also find some
evidence that labor costs are less responsive to sales revenue in more
highly regulated markets. (JEL: E24, J08, J23, K31, M51)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.88</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.88</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2007-0021_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2007-0021_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Cautionary Tale about the Use of Administrative Data: Evidence from Age of Marriage Laws</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Rebecca M.</gnm><snm>Blank</snm><aff>Brookings Institution</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Kerwin Kofi</gnm><snm>Charles</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>James M.</gnm><snm>Sallee</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>128</ppf>
<ppl>49</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper demonstrates that administrative data may be inferior to
survey data under particular circumstances. We examine the effect
of state laws governing the minimum age of marriage in the United
States. The estimated effects of these laws are much smaller when
based on retrospective reports from census versus administrative
records from Vital Statistics data. This discrepancy appears due
to systematic avoidance behavior of two kinds. Some young people
marry in states with less restrictive laws; others appear to have misrepresented
their age on their marriage certificate. Our results have
important implications regarding legal avoidance and the use of
administrative data. (JEL J12 K36)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.128</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.128</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2008-0014_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2008-0014_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Biological Model of Unions</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Kremer</snm><aff>Harvard U and Center for Global Development</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Benjamin A.</gnm><snm>Olken</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>150</ppf>
<ppl>75</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper applies principles from evolutionary biology to the study
of unions. We show that unions that implement the preferred wage
and organizing policies of workers will be displaced in evolutionary
competition by unions that either extract less from firms, allowing
them to live longer, or spend more on union organizing, or both.
This implies that unions with constitutional incumbency advantages
that allow leaders to depart from members' preferences may have a
selective advantage, allowing them to grow at the expense of unions
lacking such provisions. Evidence from the history of American
unions supports these predictions. (JEL A12, J51)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.150</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.150</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/data/2007-0003_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/app/app/2007-0003_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Elise</gnm><snm>Huillery</snm><aff>Paris School of Economics and IRD, Paris</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>176</ppf>
<ppl>215</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>To what extent do colonial public investments continue to influence
current regional inequalities in French-speaking West Africa? Using
a new database and the spatial discontinuities of colonial investment
policy, this paper gives evidence that early colonial investments
had large and persistent effects on current outcomes. The nature of
investments also matters. Current educational outcomes have been
more specifically determined by colonial investments in education
rather than health and infrastructures, and vice versa. I show that a
major channel for this historical dependency is a strong persistence
of investments; regions that got more at the early colonial times continued
to get more. (JEL H41, H54, N37, N47, 016)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.176</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.176</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7782</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7790</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-applied/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>April 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=APP&volume=1&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>ii</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.2.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/app.1.2.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


