Replication data for: A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) David A. Matsa; Amalia R. Miller
Version: View help for Version V1
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| AEJApp-2012-0348-Data | 10/12/2019 04:17:PM | ||
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text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 12:17:PM |
Project Citation:
Matsa, David A., and Miller, Amalia R. Replication data for: A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113856V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper studies the impact of gender quotas for corporate
board seats on corporate decisions. We examine the introduction of
Norway's 2006 quota, comparing affected firms to other Nordic companies,
public and private, that are unaffected by the rule. We find
that affected firms undertake fewer workforce reductions than comparison
firms, increasing relative labor costs and employment levels
and reducing short-term profits. The effects are strongest among
firms without female board members beforehand and are present
even for boards with older and more experienced members afterward.
The boards appear to be affecting corporate strategy in part
by selecting like-minded executives.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J78 Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J78 Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
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