Replication data for: Government Transfers and Political Support
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Marco Manacorda; Edward Miguel; Andrea Vigorito
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Manacorda, Marco, Miguel, Edward, and Vigorito, Andrea. Replication data for: Government Transfers and Political Support. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113792V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper estimates the impact of a large anti-poverty cash transfer program, the Uruguayan PANES, on political support for the government
that implemented it. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pretreatment eligibility score, we find that beneficiary households are 11 to 13 percentage points more likely to favor the current government relative to the previous government. Political support effects persist after the program ends. Our
results are consistent with theories of rational but poorly informed voters who use policy to infer politicians' redistributive preferences or competence, as well as with behavioral economics explanations grounded in reciprocity. (JEL D72, H23, H53, I38, O15, O17)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H53 National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H53 National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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